Mustafa Malik

Category: Islam

Exodus 2.0?

JAKE SULLIVAN’S MARATHON mission to Saudi Arabia to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations is also intended to revive the “two-state solution” to the Palestinian-Israeli imbroglio. Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman was reported to have been indifferent to the Palestinian issue, but reports from Jeddah indicate that the Saudis are now insisting on the revival of “the Arab Peace Initiative,” the 2002 proposal from the late Saudi King Abdullah that called for the creation of a Palestinian state in return for the recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

It reminds me of Haider Abdel Shafi. In 1991 Abdel Shafi had led the Palestinian delegation to the U.S.-mediated peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis, held in Madrid, Spain. I was interviewing him the following year on his visit to Washington to follow up on those talks.

I asked the Palestinian physician-turned-politician if he thought the Israelis would “allow you to have a state of your own.”

“They should,” he said, tartly, “unless they want to stay as pariahs in the Arab world for ages and ages.”

“Jack Khazmo told me,” I replied, “that you are wasting your time with the Israelis.” I quoted the editor of the Arabic-language Jerusalem weekly Al-Bayadir al-Siyasi as saying that “the Jews will not return an inch of our land until we make them truly miserable.”

Khazmo, a Palestinian Christian, was also a valiant activist in the Palestinian struggle for independence. I used to meet him on my visits to Jerusalem.

“Doesn’t being a pariah make you miserable?” Abdel Shafi said.

Abdel Shafi died in 2007. Meanwhile, four Arab states have established diplomatic relations with Israel and the Biden administration is now trying to help normalize Israel’s relations with a fifth, Saudi Arabia. If the veteran politician from Gaza were alive today, I would have asked if he still considered Israel a pariah state.

President Biden has been pretty insensitive to the horrible Israeli brutality to the Palestinians and Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. Yet he also hates Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right administration. And his relations are severely strained with bin Salman, the Saudi kingdom’s effective ruler. All the same, the American president has been trying tenaciously to help formalize the Saudi-Israeli relations.  You wonder why.

The question haunts you, especially, as bin Salman has put forward a stiff price tag for the American initiative. He wants a NATO-like defense treaty with the United States, which would oblige Americans to come to the kingdom’s defense if it’s attacked by an adversary, conceivably Iran. In addition, the Saudis want America to let them have a “peaceful” nuclear program. And bin Salman wants to see the “two-state” formula for the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict revived, mostly for the consumption of the anti-Israeli Arab public.

Biden has taken on a daunting task. The U.S. Congress or the American public would have a hard time agreeing to go to war to defend the repressive and obscurantist Arab kingdom. They would be reluctant, too, to allow Saudi Arabia to have a nuclear program, which may not remain peaceful and could one day trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Also, Netanyahu’s the far-right ministers, dominating his government, are bent expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank to absorb the territory within a Greater Israel. Persuading them to concede a Palestinian state would be next to impossible.

Biden’s gambit

Actually, Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, has been assigned a task that is irrelevant to the reality on the ground. Saudi and Israeli intelligence agencies have been cooperating for years. The Saudi government uses Israeli intelligence and tools to track internal dissent. Riyadh has allowed Israeli aircraft to use its air space. It’s courting Israeli investments and is talking about allowing Saudi investments in Israel. If they feel the need, the Saudis and Israelis could formalize their relationship without outside help. About the only reason the monarchy isn’t embracing Israel publicly is the everyday Saudi citizens’ loathing for Israel, mainly because of the Jewish colonization of Palestine and the daily Jewish atrocities toward Palestinians.

“If it weren’t for [Saudi] public hostility toward the [Israeli] Jews, bin Salman would have jumped into Netanyahu’s bed,” a Saudi businessman told me this off-color joke last summer in Arlington, Virginia, on condition of anonymity. As Abdel Shafi said 31 years ago, Israel remains a pariah state to most Arabs, Saudis included.

An Arab Barometer poll has shown that support for the recognition of Israel by Arab states is 5% in Egypt, 5% in Jordan, 6% in Palestine, 14% in Iraq, 17% in Lebanon, 7% in Libya, 11% in Tunisia, 4% in Algeria, and so on. And an Israeli public opinion survey has found 35% of Saudis support the normalization of their kingdom’s relations with Israel, but only 24% of them accept Israel’s right to exist and 88% insist on the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Biden’s widely publicized interest in normalizing Saudi-Israeli relations is plainly opportunistic and cynical. Donald Trump, his predecessor as president, started the normalization of Israel’s relations with Arab states through what is called “Abraham Accords,” which is one of the few foreign-policy issues supported by most Americans, Democrats and Republicans. Democrat Biden sees Republican Trump as his likely rival for the presidency in next year’s election.  By engaging publicly in the talks to help Israel formalize its relations with a key Arab state, Biden is trying to steal the popular issue from his potential Republican rival. Well, even if he fails, American voters and America’s powerful Israel lobby would remember his efforts.

I didn’t mention to Abdel Shafi the history of Jewish communities living as pariahs among Europeans, Egyptians, Romans, Assyrians, Babylonians, and so forth. The problem, however, is with living within a modern nation-state with a growing and increasingly assertive Palestinian population.

I see Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation and atrocities increasing progressively, prompting ever more brutal Jewish reprisal. But I don’t believe that the 21st century will be putting up with this grave injustice for very long. With prospects for a separate Palestinian state almost non-existent, Palestinians, Israelis and the world will be forced to deal with the reality of a single state between the Jordan River and the sea. In this state  Jews are 6.5 million and Palestinians 6.41 million. The Palestinian birth rate is 4.1 children per woman, compared to the Jewish 3.1 children. Greater Israel is going to be a Palestinian-majority state pretty soon.

In April 2016 Biden, then U.S. vice president, said the continued expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank was creating a “one-state reality,” and that Jews won’t remain the majority in such a state. Earlier, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told the Israeli daily Ha’aretz that without a separate Palestinian state, which is now practically impossible to create, Israel would face “a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights” in which case “Israel [would be] finished.”

But would the “one-state solution” be a real solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute? Ray Hanania, a Palestinian-American journalist, says that the idea of Jews and Palestinians living peaceably together in a Muslim-majority state is “fundamentally flawed.” He asks: “Exactly where do Jews and Christians live in the Islamic world today side-by-side with equality?”

Many among the Israeli intelligentsia see themselves face to face with this challenge. Benny Morris, the famed Israeli historian, says Jews won’t be able to live in a Palestinian-majority state in “stifling darkness, intolerance, authoritarianism.” He predicts that most Israeli Jews would eventually migrate to Western countries, with only those unable to do so for practical reasons and Ultra-Orthodox Jews staying behind.  The late Steven Plaut, a writer and economist at Haifa University, agreed. He referred to the “one-state solution” as the “Rwanda Solution.”  He warned that an Israeli-Palestinian state ruled by a Palestinian majority would eventually lead to a “new Holocaust.”

Palestinians won’t, of course, be doing to the Jews what the Nazis did to them, but life for modern, high tech, affluent Jews among a religiously conservative Muslim majority with memories of many Jewish injustices would be, to repeat Khazmo’s expression, “truly miserable.”  Israeli journalist Gershom Gorenberg writes that a Muslim-majority Israel would just collapse economically. Like Morris, he says the Jewish intelligentsia won’t be able to cope in it, and that most of them would emigrate to the West.

You can call that Exodus 2.0, reminiscent of the biblical Hebrew Exodus from Egypt, led by Moses.

~Mustafa Malik, the host of the blog After the Clash, worked 32 years as a reporter, columnist and editor for American newspapers. In the 1990s he conducted fieldwork on American foreign policy options in Israel and five Arab countries as a researcher for the University of Chicago Middle East Center.

Turkish nationalism wins in Turkey

LIKE MOST EUROPEAN and American pollsters and pundits, I was surprised by Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s victory in both the first and second round of the Turkish presidential election. In fact in my last blog entry (“Erdogan: Secular Muslim icon”), I said Erdogan could be walking into the sunset of his political career in this election.

I hadn’t visited Turkey for years and was relying on the forecasts of Western pundits, who were saying that Turkey’s high inflation rates (45%-85%), skyrocketing prices of essential goods, and the Erdogan regime’s slow response to the disastrous Feb. 6 earthquake would inevitably hand the election to the staunchly secularist opposition candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu.

Since Erdogan was reelected president on Sunday, I’ve gone through explanations of his victory by various scholars and commentators. None seemed to spotlight the event as poignantly as a comment made by a taxi driver in Istanbul a quarter-century ago.

On a muggy August afternoon in 1999 I hailed a taxi near my apartment on Istanbul’s Aydede Caddesi, a bloc from the city’s historic Taksim Square.

“Boazici University,” I instructed the cabbie.

I had a 3:30 p.m. interview Professor Binnaz Toprak, a famed political scientist at the university. I was researching the outlook for Turkey’s accession to the European Union and, at that point, trying to learn how the country’s steaming Islamic resurgence might be affecting the issue.

Kerem was in his late 30s, from near the Anatolian city of Eskisehir, and had been a cabbie in Istanbul for six years. He communicated with me with a mixture of Turkish and English words and physical gestures.

What did he think of Mesut Yilmaz? I asked. Ultra-secularist Yilmaz was Turkiye’s prime minister.

“Hirsiz,” he said. The Turkish word meant thief.

“Is Tansu Ciller good?” I inquired. Ciller had preceded Yilmaz as prime minister.

“Not good,” he replied in English. “Not good.” He waved his right hand dismissively.

“Is Tayyip Erdogan any good?” I asked.

Erdogan had been known at that time as a gung-ho Islamist. (He would proclaim himself a “secular Muslim” later.) Just three weeks before, the second-ranking leader of Turkiye’s Islamist Virtue Party had come out of prison, having served a four-month term to which he had been sentenced by an ultra-secularist court. His crime: He had recited a provocative Islamic poem at a public meeting. Erdogan had also been fired from the post of mayor of Istanbul for the same offense. All this had made the former Istanbul mayor a rock star among, not just Islamists, but most everyday Muslim Turks who resented the radically secular system that banned Islamic symbols in the public sphere and discriminated against practicing Muslims.

“Good!” the cabbie replied enthusiastically. “Tayyip Erdogan good.”

“Erdogan, basbakan!” the man continued. Basbakan means prime minister. He obviously meant that he wanted to see Erdogan as prime minister of Turkiye.

“Erdogan!” he repeated excitedly, took both his hands off the wheel and began kissing his fingers.

The car swerved to the right, and then to the left.

“Stop!” I shouted. “Steady the car now and drive carefully.”

I wanted to get to the university alive and didn’t say another word until we arrived at the Boazici University parking area. Before getting off, I asked Kerem why he was so excited (heyecanlı) about Erdogan.

“Toorkish,” he said, with soft “t”. “No Avrupali,” meaning European.

I had some half an hour to the interview and was thinking of what the man was trying say about Erdogan as I strolled the bank of the adjacent Bosphorus Strait, which splits off the European part of Istanbul from its Asian segment and links the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara and the Mediterranean and eventually to the Atlantic Ocean via the Gibraltar. I got distracted from my thoughts about Kerem and Erdogan as I reminisced my previous visit to the iconic landscape, about which Henry Adams wrote, “The Judas tree will bloom for you on the Bosphorus if you get there in time.” I didn’t see any Judas tree greeting me; but the ripples of the Bosphorus, sparkling in the sun, seemed to be welcoming me.

I had known Toprak from an earlier interview. The political science professor handed me a folder with several clips of her writings. I began the conversation by narrating my cab driver’s excitement about Erdogan. What was he trying to say about Erdogan being “Turkish” and not “Avrupali”? I asked.

She said the man had “summed up” why many Turks supported Erdogan and “the so-called Islamist movement” in Turkey. The driver obviously was “Islamic-minded” because he admired Erdogan, she said. Erdogan and most other Turkish Islamists represented “the Turkish brand” of Islam. Turkish Muslims, she explained, didn’t care much about Arabs and “many of them aren’t fond of Europeans,” even though the founder of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and his followers, known as “Kemalists,” were.  Toprak added that by saying he liked Erdogan because he wasn’t “Avrupali,” Kerem was “telling you that he resented the secularist Turkish establishment’s Europhilia.”

On the evening of May 13 – the day before the first round of Turkish elections – Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Erdogan’s rival from Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP), concluded his campaign with a visit to the mausoleum of the anti-Islamic founder of the nation. Erdogan, on the other hand, marked the end of his campaign with a prayer at Hagia Sophia Mosque. Hagia Sophia used to be the world’s most majestic Christian cathedral until the Ottoman sultan Mehmet II conquered Istanbul (then called Constantinople) in 1453 and converted the cathedral into a mosque. In 1934 Ataturk turned it into a museum. In 2020 Erdogan reconverted the museum into a mosque.

If Kerem was listening to his president’s victory speech Sunday night, he must have been pleased to hear him say that his triumph over Kilicdaroglu was a victory of Turkey and “all Turkic people,” emphasizing further his Turkish cultural identity.

It actually was a victory for Turkish nationalism and culture, as different from other Muslim national cultures. It certainly marked a rejection of European culture, favored by Kilicdaroglu and other Kemalists – and Ataturk.

  • Mustafa Malik, who hosts the blog After the Clash, researched Turkish-European relations as a journalism fellow for the German Marshall Fund of the United States.